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Economic Perspective 1 
THE GREEN PAPER ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 
Roger Sandilands 
Departmentof Economics, University of Strathclyde 
Mrs Thatcher f i r s t promised to scrap the 
domestic ra t ing system in 1974 when she 
became leader of the Conservative Party. 
Since then the Layfield Commission in 
1976, the Green Paper Al ternat ives to 
Domestic Rates in 1981 and a 1983 White 
Paper have a l l rejected any radical change 
to the domestic r a t i n g system. In 
par t i cu la r , the local income tax, local 
sales tax and local poll tax alternatives 
were rejected as e i ther unworkable, too 
costly, or too regressive. 
Despite widespread scepticism in her own 
Cabinet and in the Treasury, Mrs Thatcher 
has insisted that a way had to be found to 
scrap the domestic ra t ing system and to 
modify the business rating system. There 
were two main reasons . F i r s t , she 
believes that local authority spending has 
been excessive and tha t more effective 
methods for controlling this spending had 
to be found. Various measures have 
already been taken, such as rate-capping 
and grant penalties. However, i t i s held 
that the underlying reason for 'excessive' 
spending by local au thor i t i e s i s the i r 
lack of accountability to local electors. 
Most of these electors, i t is claimed, do 
not pay l o c a l r a t e s , and so do not 
perceive any d i rec t l ink between local 
a u t h o r i t y spend ing and t h e i r own 
c o n t r i b u t i o n to the f inance of t h i s 
spending. 
Secondly, local rates were said to be very 
unpopular, especially with Tory party 
supporters. This view was confirmed by 
the furore in Scotland over the ra tes 
revaluation of 1985. The revaluation 
exercise was delayed by two years beyond 
the normal s tatutory five year in terval 
s i n c e t h e l a s t one in 1978. A 
revaluation announced in the Spring of 
1983 would not have helped Conservative 
party fortunes in the General Election of 
that year. However, the Secretary of 
S t a t e merely s tored up more t r oub l e 
because the delay simply made rateable 
values more out of l ine with changing 
amenities and developments in different 
areas. In England there has been no 
revaluation since 1973 and the Government 
n a t u r a l l y dreads the even g r e a t e r 
adjustments that in fairness are required 
there. 
The u n p o p u l a r i t y of r a t e s du r ing 
revaluations has l i t t l e to do with any 
i n t r i n s i c unfairness. I t i s l e s s fa i r 
not to revalue, and people in Scotland 
would have been l e s s aggrieved i f 
r e v a l u a t i o n had been u n d e r t a k e n 
s imul taneously in England and Wales. 
However, Mrs Thatcher has also been much 
exercised over a different reason why 
ra tes are perceived as "unfair" by many. 
This i s the view, expressed strongly in 
the Green Paper, that the single-person 
household pays the same rates as a family 
of four working persons occupying a 
s imilar house next door. Nor, says the 
Green Paper, i s i t f a i r tha t a s imilar 
family living in a similar four-bedroomed 
detached house should pay more in Luton 
(£970) than in C a r l i s l e (£550), j u s t 
because of different rateable values (£580 
against £330). Presumably, the same 
logic would mean tha t i t i s unfair tha t 
the Duke of Westminster pays more ra tes 
for l iving in Belgravia than a person 
l iving in Drumchapel or in a croft on 
Skye. 
The new proposals 
The Green Paper summarily dismisses the 
local income tax and local sales tax 
a l t e rna t ives . As I explained in an 
art icle in the last Commentary (November 
1985) these are objectionable on grounds 
of practicality, cost, certainty, effects 
on incentives to work, wage demands and 
opportunities for cross-border shopping. 
Two main proposals are contained in the 
Green Paper. The f i r t i s to move towards 
the abolition of domestic rating in favour 
of a uniform "community charge" on a l l 
adults resident in a par t icular local 
authority. Secondly, local au thor i t i es 
would be deprived of the power to set 
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local non-domestic (business) rates- At 
present the ra te poundage var ies widely 
throughout Bri tain (though l e s s so in 
Scotland), reflecting differences in local 
authority spending per capita. Instead, 
central government would fix a uniform 
bus iness r a t e poundage according to 
central government's view on national 
expenditure ta rge ts . Local au thor i t i es 
would c o l l e c t bus iness r a t e s as a t 
present, but transfer these to a central 
pool. These wi l l then be redis t r ibuted 
to local au thor i t i es on a uniform per 
capita grant basis. 
Because these changes have s ignif icant 
implications for the finances both of 
i n d i v i d u a l r a t e p a y e r s and l o c a l 
au thor i t ies i t i s proposed to phase them 
in over a t r a n s i t i o n a l per iod. In 
Scotland t h e r e has r ecen t ly been a 
revaluation of a l l property and there are 
l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a t i o n s in r a t e 
poundage than in the r e s t of Great 
Bri tain. Therefore, the Government 
in tends in t roduc ing the changes here 
sooner than in England and with a shorter 
transit ion period. 
Leg i s l a t i on w i l l be t ime- t ab led for 
Scotland in the 1986/7 par l iamentary 
session with a view to implementing the 
f i r s t stages of change in April 1989. A 
uniform community charge of £50 per head 
wi l l be levied i n i t i a l l y , along with a 
corresponding reduction in domestic rates 
by about W%. After three years the 
average community charge wi l l be around 
£209 in Scotland (£229 in Strathclyde), 
based on current local spending levels , 
and domestic r a t e s w i l l be scrapped 
completely. 
Business ra te poundage will ini t ial ly be 
frozen in real terms (that i s , allowed to 
increase only in l ine with an inf la t ion 
index). As in England and Wales, non-
domestic rateable values in Scotland will 
be revalued in 1990. Eventually i t i s 
hoped to move towards a va lua t ion 
procedure that i s harmonised with the 
English system and then to move towards 
the uniform national poundage rate. All 
business ra tes would be pooled centrally 
and redistributed to local authorities on 
a standard per capita basis. 
There would be few significant changes to 
the present system of allocating central 
government grants in aid of specific 
services such as the police or in the 
"needs grant" system that compensates 
au thor i t ies with, for example, a larger 
number of school-children than average, or 
above-average costs because of remoteness 
or sparsity of population. The Exchequer 
wi l l also continue to provide 'standard' 
per capita grants to subsidise local 
au tho r i t y spending from national tax 
revenues. 
Gainers and losers 
Who would be the gainers and losers from 
these changes? Let us f i rs t consider the 
effect on the overall revenues received by 
different local authorities because, as we 
shall see, t h i s wi l l affect the level of 
the community charge imposed in different 
a r e a s . We can then d i s c u s s t he 
distributive effects on households of the 
shift from domestic rates to the standard 
community charge. 
The local authorities that would gain most 
would be those with re la t ive ly low per 
capita spending and those with relatively 
high domestic rateable values. Under the 
p resen t system resource equalisation 
grants favour those au thor i t ies with low 
rateable values for domestic and business 
properties combined. I t also favours 
those with high poundages. Under the new 
system the r e would be no resource 
e q u a l i s a t i o n g ran t s except under the 
uniform business ra te system. The new 
system would equa l i s e bus iness r a t e 
revenues per capita but would not equalise 
domestic revenues , which are to be 
scrapped. Nor would the Government pay a 
h i g h e r poundage to h i g h - s p e n d i n g 
au thor i t i es . The community charge for 
areas where housing is cheap and/or of 
infer ior quali ty would be higher unless 
these au thor i t ies cut thei r expenditure, 
Districts such as Glasgow, where there i s 
a disporportionate amount of low value 
council housing, would have to obtain the 
average per capita domestic rate entirely 
from the community charge on i t s 
residents. Residents would, however, be 
e l ig ib le for rebates of up to 80% of the 
community charge, and central government 
would continue to meet this b i l l . 
High spending author i t ies w i l l not be 
allowed to increase business rates and so 
will be forced to increase the community 
charge. Res idents , but not l oca l 
businessmen, nor outsiders who come into a 
ci ty to work, shop or do business, wil l 
bear the whole of the marginal cost of 
higher than average per capita expenditure 
by their dis tr ict councils. 
The new community charge, i s of course, 
highly regressive except at the lowest 
income levels where progressive rebates 
have a s ignif icant offsett ing effect. 
However, loss of rebates as incomes move 
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from around £50 to £100 a week wi l l tend 
to accen tua te the poverty t r a p and 
discourage young people from seeking work. 
The biggest beneficiaries will be the very 
r ich. The couple l iv ing in a Belgravia 
f lat will perhaps pay £400 to their local 
authority instead of £4,000. 
Equal benefits from local services 
The Green Paper j u s t i f i e s t h i s change on 
the grounds tha t the r ich do not benefit 
much more from services provided by local 
au thor i t i e s than do people l iving in 
council f l a t s in Drumchapel. I t also 
states that some single-person households 
on low incomes live in dwellings with high 
rateable values and so would pay less 
under the community charge. 
There a r e , however, s t rong coun te r -
arguments. F i r s t , "hard cases make bad 
laws". Hard-luck cases are best deal t 
with by specific provisions, and, indeed, 
the current ra tes rebate scheme does 
a l l ev ia t e the posit ion of poor widowed 
pensioners l iv ing alone. I t should be 
remembered tha t most pensioners have 
already paid off the i r mortgages, and so 
may have higher disposable incomes than 
some working couples. This i s not taken 
into account in the Green Paper's figures. 
More fundamentally, however, the basic 
premises of the Green Paper that domestic 
ra tes should be paid only to finance the 
current cost of local authority services, 
and that these services tend to be enjoyed 
equally by all are open to question. 
Amenities and land values 
To u n d e r s t a n d t h i s , c o n s i d e r two 
n e i g h b o u r h o o d s in a c i t y , one a 
fashionable middle-class area, the other a 
working c lass council e s t a t e on the edge 
of the c i ty . Property values in both 
areas comprise two elements: one i s the 
value of the bricks and mortar; the other 
i s the s i t e value of the ground on which 
the property stands. In the middle-class 
area the si te value is often greater than 
the value of the bricks and mortar. In 
an area l ike Drumchapel land values are 
only a small fraction of the value of 
f l a t s and houses. Some of these houses 
are not much different from a few council 
houses bu i l t in middle-class areas which 
would s e l l for perhaps four times the 
price they could fetch in Drumchapel. 
The difference is accounted for mainly by 
land values. 
If a local authority wants to build a new 
school in the middle-class area i t incurs 
substant ia l land acquisi t ion costs - or 
would do i f i t did not already own the 
land, or i f the land were not zoned for 
that specific purpose so that i t had no 
alternative allowable use. Explicitly or 
impl ic i t ly , the land has a very high 
opportunity cost . I t has a very high 
potential value because if i t were offered 
for sale on the free market there would be 
a competitive clamour to buy. Valuable 
housing, shops or offices could have been 
erected on the si te . They represent the 
s u b s t a n t i a l oppor tuni ty foregone by 
building the school. The local authority 
may or may not pay that opportunity cost 
exp l i c i t l y , because i t may already be 
owner of the land or because of zoning 
r e s t r i c t i o n s . I t i s , nevertheless, the 
t rue opportunity cost in the economic 
sense. 
The o p p o r t u n i t y c o s t of l and in 
Drumchapel, however, i s very low. Thus 
Drumchapel children are educated at lower 
cos t than the ch i ld ren in Glasgow's 
fash ionable Hyndland, or Edinburgh's 
Morningside. 
The same principle also applies to a range 
of other amenities provided by local 
authorities. I t may not cost much today 
to maintain a park or an exist ing museum 
or theatre. But these amenities did cost 
a great deal to create in the past and 
today they s t i l l have a very high 
opportunity cost if located in fashionable 
neighbourhoods (where parkland could 
realise millions if released for building) 
or in valuable down-town business areas. 
These are amenities which tend to be 
enjoyed disproportionately by the r ich, 
who live in the valuable neighbourhoods. 
Low exp l i c i t f inancial costs incurred by 
local authorities should not be allowed to 
hide the high implicit opportunity cost of 
services. 
The high rateable values assessed on 
properties where the rich tend to live or 
work are a reflection of the high amenity 
value of the areas where these properties 
are located. Many of these amenities are 
the result of expenditures incurred today 
or in the past , by local and central 
government. High s i te values also arise 
because of t he ameni ty va lue and 
accessibility of private shops and offices 
in the area. Accessibil i ty depends on 
public t ransport services and the road 
n e t w o r k . The g r e a t e r t h e l o c a l 
population the greater the demand on space 
and the greater i t s opportunity cost. 
The richer i s that population, the greater 
the business for shops and offices. This 
i s a l l reflected in high land vlues and 
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high land r e n t s . These va lues are 
created by the whole community. The 
value of a particular s i te i s not created 
by i t s i n d u s t r i a l owner or occupier. 
Indeed, a s i te in a down-town area may l i e 
empty for years yet be extremely valuable. 
The two elements of assessed rateable 
values 
If land values are created by the whole 
community, a strong case can be made for 
returning these values to the community. 
This principle i s impl ic i t ly accepted in 
the present rat ing system. Dis t r i c t 
valuers assess the annual rental value of 
a l l propert ies and owners pay ra tes 
accordingly . However, t h r e e major 
defects of the present system can be 
idetified. 
First, a l l agricultural land and the urban 
land that i s lying idle are exempted. This 
has the effect of increasing agricultural 
land prices and the rents that tenant 
farmers pay their landlords. Money that 
would be paid in r a t e s to the l o c a l 
authority are paid instead to the landlord 
in higher rents. The exemption of vacant 
urban land encourages the speculative 
hoarding of land, which drives up the 
price of land generally, makes land more 
scarce, and forces a more disperse pattern 
of urban sprawl development at high social 
cost. 
Secondly, the rateable value of property 
i n c l u d e s t h e va lue of man-made 
improvements. If a householder instals 
c e n t r a l hea t ing , bu i ld s a garage or 
instals a new bathroom he is penalised by 
heavier taxation. If an i n d u s t r i a l i s t 
instals new plant and equipment he too is 
penalised. In several parts of the 
United States land is assessed separately 
from improvements and taxed at a higher 
rate. Other countries, such as Australia 
and New Zealand exempt improvements and 
levy the local ra te only on s i t e values. 
This has the effect of reducing land 
p r i c e s - making i t e a s i e r for small 
companies to start-up in business and for 
f a m i l i e s to buy new housing - while 
stimulating improvements and the more 
intensive use of land, subject to the 
usual zoning regulations. 
Thi rd ly , r eva lua t ion occurs fa r too 
infrequently. This a l lows r a t e a b l e 
values to move far out of l ine with the 
current amenity value of land. Part ly, 
the reason for the infrequency of 
revaluation i s the very high cost of 
assessing every single property inclusive 
of i t s unique se t of bu i l d ings and 
improvements. I t i s far easier and 
quicker to assess the value of s i t e s 
alone, ignoring improvements, and to draw 
up land value maps available for general 
inspection. 
An additional objection to the present 
rating system, that would apply equally to 
a system that rated s i t e values only, i s 
the poor-widow argument. However, we have 
noted already that special provisions can 
be made to deal with specific hard-luck 
cases, notably through a rebate system 
attached to the person rather than the 
property. I t makes l i t t l e sense to 
relieve everyone of rates in order to help 
a very small proportion of hard-luck 
cases. I t may also be noted that if the 
community charge does replace domestic 
ra tes i t may reduce the ra tes b i l l for 
many single persons but would at the same 
time provide a greater incentive for these 
persons to occupy large properties on 
valuable space. They w i l l be l e s s 
inclined to move to smaller dwellings or 
to' take in lodgers. This will lessen the 
intensi ty of use of the existing housing 
stock and increase the need for new house-
building and associated infrastructure. 
Another perverse effect of the community 
charge upon occupancy rates would be that 
persons currently lodging in larger or 
more valuable houses may feel unable to 
pay such high rents as before and move 
down-market. The overall supply of rooms 
for rent to students and others would 
f a l l . I t could increase homelessness, 
especialy when homelessness would be one 
way to avoid paying the community charge. 
Voters and ratepayers 
At t h i s poin t we should h i g h l i g h t a 
pervasive fallacy that runs throughout the 
Green Paper: namely, by pointing out that 
only 29% of the Scottish e lectora te and 
only 34% of the English e lectora te pay 
f u l l r a t e s , p lus another 9-10% of 
ratepayers who receive par t i a l rebates, 
the Green Paper implies that two-thirds of 
voters make no contribution to local 
authority expenditure and are paras i tes . 
This implication i s fal lacious for a 
number of reasons. 
F i r s t , everyone contributes to national 
taxation, which i s the main source of 
local finance through rate support grants, 
e i ther through sales taxes or incomes 
taxes, or both. Secondly, almost a l l 
adults make an indirect contribution to 
the rates because a l l household members 
contribute to general household expenses, 
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including r a t e s , d i rec t ly in cash or 
indi rect ly in kind, as housewives or 
handyworkers. Likewise a portion of the 
rent that lodgers pay i s used to pay the 
r a t e s . Only a small p ropor t ion of 
households are e l ig ib l e for fu l l r e l i e f 
from their rates b i l l s . I t i s frequently 
said that the household with four working 
adul ts should pay more because i t i s 
earning more than the two adul t , two 
schoolchildren household next door and 
therefore has greater ab i l i t y to pay. 
However, this family i s contributing more 
through income and expenditure taxation. 
Also, the adult household i s currently 
b e n e f i t t i n g l e s s from educa t iona l 
expenditures than i s the family with 
schoolchildren and so, on the benefit 
pr inciple emphasised in the Green Paper, 
there is a case for a somewhat lower rate 
per adu l t head in t h a t household. 
Perhaps more important, however, i s the 
fact that the larger household uses l ess 
space per person , which has a r e a l 
opportunity cost measured by i t s rateable 
value. 
The Government i s evidently operating 
double standards in i t s approach to the 
domestic and non-domestic sec tors , for 
there i s no proposal to abolish business 
rates. Yet in the Government's argument 
r a t e s do not r e f l e c t the b e n e f i t s 
businesses receive from local authority 
expenditure. And they have no vote. 
For tuna te ly the Government has not 
followed the logic of these arguments for 
scrapping bus ine s s r a t e s along with 
domestic rates. 
Nevertheless, there i s here clear merit in 
again distinguishing the two components of 
r a t e a b l e value for i n d u s t r i a l and 
commercial premises. The s i t e value 
element r e f l ec t s the general community-
created amenities. Some of these are 
provided through l o c a l or n a t i o n a l 
Government out of current expenditures. 
Others - the railway and road system, 
a i r p o r t s and the p u b l i c u t i l i t y 
inf ras t ruc ture - have been provided by 
Government in the past. Land values are 
fu r the r enhanced by the degree of 
proximity to suppliers of raw mater ia ls , 
components and the workforce. Closeness 
to distribution systems and customers also 
affects land values. Shops, fac tor ies 
and offices do not enjoy these elements 
equally. The differences are reflected 
in differential land values and rentals. 
These rents are a fixed cost of production 
but are o f f s e t by the corresponding 
increase in productivi ty, or lower unit 
variable costs of production. Thus rents 
do not enter the product pr ice . Rents 
are a surplus. The only question i s : 
who is to capture this surplus? Private 
landowners or the community which created 
the surplus? The present rating system 
does return a portion of land values to 
the community, and thereby keeps land 
prices lower than they would otherwise be. 
Abol i t ion of r a t e s would provide a 
windfall gain to landowners, j u s t as i t 
wi l l do in the case of domestic r a tes . 
(The Green Paper re luctant ly admits t h i s 
point on Annex E. Anthony Harris, in the 
Lombard Column of the Financial Times, 30 
January 1986, also makes t h i s point and 
favours the s i te value rating alternative 
considered below.) 
The second element of rateable values, 
namely man-made improvements, i s , however, 
much more d i f f i cu l t to jus t i fy as the 
basis for taxation. Land i s in fixed 
supply and a charge for i t s use does not 
a l t e r the supply, al though i t would 
increase i t s ava i lab i l i ty if the charge 
applied equally to land currently held 
i d l e f o r s p e c u l a t i v e p u r p o s e s . 
Improvements - b u i l d i n g s , p l an t and 
equipment - are not, however, in fixed 
supply and a tax on t h i s element of 
r a t e a b l e v a l u e s does d i s c o u r a g e 
development. 
The sitevalue rating alternative 
A more sensible reform of the rat ing 
system would t h e r e f o r e involve a 
progressive move away from the composite 
ra te on land and improvements towards a 
rate that fel l only on regularly assessed 
land values. This system of s i t e value 
rating could apply equally to domestic and 
non-domestic properties. 
Site value rating commends i tself on most 
of the cri teria usually required of a good 
tax. F i r s t , i t i s d i f f i cu l t to avoid. 
Land, unlike man-made improvements or 
people themselves, cannot be hidden and 
cannot move. 
Secondly, i t i s efficient. I t encourages 
more intensive use of land, subject to 
planning res t r i c t ions . (Land values are 
assed at the maximum permitted use value 
as r e f l e c t e d by market demand.) I t 
pe rmi t s the p rog res s ive removal of 
d iscouraging taxes upon labour and 
cap i t a l , which are e l a s t i c in supply and 
which could therefore be expected to 
increase if taxed less severely. 
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Thirdly, i t costs much less to administer 
than the composite rating system because 
valuers do not need to examine the s ta te 
of buildings and other improvements. In 
Bri tain i t s p r a c t i c a b i l i t y has been 
demonstrated in two pilot surveys carried 
out in Whitstable, Kent (Wilks, 1974). 
Fourthly, i t s incidence i s more cer ta in . 
The burden of a land tax f a l l s on the 
landowners and cannot normally be passed 
on to tenants or consumers. Tenants will 
normally be paying the full economic rent 
already and a tax on rent would mean they 
would pay less to the landlord, i f the 
b i l l were presented to the tenant as 
occupier . I f the r a t e s b i l l were 
presented to the landowner he would simply 
pay the b i l l out of the rents received 
from tenants. Likewise a tax on rent 
cannot be passed on to consumers because 
r e n t s a r e n o t a v a r i a b l e c o s t of 
production. 
F i f t h l y , i t s y ie ld i s p r e d i c t a b l e . 
Rateable values are known at the s tar t of 
the financial year and, depending on the 
poundage s e t , the y ie ld i s known in 
advance because i t is such a difficult tax 
to avoid. 
Sixthly, i t accords with the benefit 
pr inciple . Rateable values re f lec t the 
potential benefits, in money terms, that a 
s i t e can be expected to yield if put to 
i t s optimum use . This v a l u e i s 
determined by what people in the market 
place are actually prepared to pay for i t s 
services if given a chance to rent i t . 
The unimproved si te i tself has zero costs 
of production. 
Land i s the ^free g i f t of nature ' . (The 
same applies to a l l natural resources, 
including North Sea o i l . ) I t does, 
however, have a monetary value, which i s 
therefore a pure surplus or monopoly rent. 
This is created by the whole community and 
the re fo re properly belongs to the 
community. Improvements, however, do 
have a cost of production. There is no 
surplus there and if improvements were 
taxed the supply would fall . 
On a related terminological issue, i t i s 
of in te res t to note that the Green Paper 
deliberately chooses the term "community 
charge" rather than community tax to 
describe the Government's proposal. This 
i s because the Government i n s i s t s that 
payment i s for services rendered by the 
local authority, or benefits received, and 
so is a charge similar to the charge made 
by the baker for a loaf of bread. A tax, 
by contrast, i s a compulsory payment with 
no d i r e c t l i n k to personal benef i t s 
rece ived. We have seen t h a t the 
community charge i s in fact part ly a tax 
because local authority services are not 
provided equally, and certainly not at 
equal cost. 
Insofar as the payment made for the right 
to use land or natural resources i s a 
payment d i r e c t l y l inked to bene f i t s 
received - the value of the asset - s i t e 
value rating i s , properly speaking, not a 
tax but a charge or fee for use of 
benefits provided by the community. In 
this i t differs fundamentally from taxes 
on improvements, which are provided by 
individuals not the community as a whole. 
I t differs also from income taxes on 
labour or taxes on in te res t and profi t 
income (where in te res t and prof i t are 
defined s t r i c t l y as returns on capi tal 
exclusive of explicit or imputed land rent 
payments). 
The final criterion or canon of a good tax 
i s that i t accords with ab i l i t y to pay. 
In gene ra l , people - householders or 
businessman - who occupy the more valuable 
space - for dwellings, shops, offices, 
factories of farms - are the more wealthy 
or have highest gross value of turnover. 
Usually, therefore they have greatest 
a b i l i t y to pay higher r e n t s . If a 
business i s unable to pay the market rent 
i t must be a r e f l e c t i o n of r e l a t i v e 
inefficiency and there is natural pressure 
either to improve efficiency or to vacate 
the land in favour of those who are able 
and willing to pay the market price. In 
the case of households there will be 
families who fal l on hard times, or whose 
income f a l l s because of retirement or 
because adult working family members move 
out in to t h e i r own homes. If the 
remaining family wishes to stay rather 
than move into a smaller dwelling they 
must somehow find money for the ra tes . 
In some cases the community may choose to 
help th is family with rebates. This i s 
e a s i l y accomplished and i s already 
practiced under the present rating system. 
The community charge proposal faces the 
same problems with hard-luck cases, which 
can be al leviated through the rebate 
scheme. But in general the community 
charge is regressive and uncorrelated with 
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a b i l i t y to pay. On a l l the o ther 
c r i t e r i a of a good tax the community 
charge fai ls the test : i t i s difficult to 
e n f o r c e , e x p e n s i v e to a d m i n i s t e r , 
unpredictable in yield, uncertain in i t s 
u l t i m a t e i nc idence , and only p a r t l y 
accords with the benefit pr inc ip le . I t 
does nothing to increase incentives to 
work or enterprise. On al l these counts 
s i te value rating wins over the community 
c h a r g e and over t h e o t h e r main 
a l t e r n a t i v e s such as the l o c a l (or 
national) income tax, sales tax or the 
present composite rating system. 
Accountability and perceptibility 
Final ly , however, we should examine how 
s i t e value r a t i n g compares wi th the 
Government's proposals judged against the 
c r i t e r i a of a c c o u n t a b i l i t y and 
p e r c e p t i b i l i t y t h a t a re so g r e a t l y 
stressed in the Green Paper. Under si te 
value rat ing a l l voters except those in 
receipt of full rebates would contribute 
d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y to the r a t e s 
because everyone occupying space has to 
pay rent . 
I t would remain true, as under the present 
system, that businessmen who pay rates on 
the land where the i r shops, offices and 
fac tor ies are located would not have a 
vote unless they also resided in the same 
local authority area. Absentee landlords 
would be in the same posi t ion. If the 
local authori ty increased i t s level of 
expenditure, i t would need to increase the 
ra te poundage on s i t e values, and these 
nonresident ratepayers would have no vote 
on the matter. However, so long as rates 
are levied only on s i t e values and the 
poundage never exceeds 100%, ra tes b i l l s 
are only a fee for locat ional advantages 
that are "Godgiven" or communitycreated. 
When the site value rate i s less than 100% 
the landowner continues to expropriate 
part of the surplus value created by the 
community and there seems no basis in j u s t i c e to complain that he has no vote, 
s t i l l less that his voting rights are not 
proportional to his ra te payments. We 
are not entitled to vote at a supermarket 
shareholders' meeting jus t because we do 
our weekly shopping at tha t supermarket. 
Every landowner does, however, have his 
equal right to vote in local and national 
e lect ions and in t h i s way help influence 
the way that communitycreated s i te value 
rates revenues are spent by the community. 
A n a t u r a l l i m i t on l o c a l a u t h o r i t y 
expenditure would be imposed by the total 
ra teable value of land. Assuming that 
revaluations are undertaken regularly 
the re should be no need to impose a 
poundage greater than 100%. To go beyond 
this l imit would involve not only charging 
a fee for s i te value benefits but charging 
a l so a tax on labour and manmade 
improvements (capi ta l ) . This danger 
could be a v e r t e d by l e g i s l a t i o n 
prohibiting ra te poundages from r is ing 
beyond a certain point. 
However, there remains the problem that 
r a t e a b l e va lues are very unevenly 
d is t r ibuted throughout Bri tain and, as 
done under the present system, there must 
be some mechanism for spreading these 
resources more evenly on a per capita 
basis. This permits every member of the 
community to share more equitably in the 
surplus that the whole community has 
created collectively. Arrangements very 
similar to those presently operated under 
the needs and resource equalisation grant 
systems can be continued. Authorities 
which choose to spend more than average 
per head of popula t ion (after taking 
account of differences in objective needs, 
such as number of schoolchildren) would 
need to levy a higher ra te poundage than 
average and be answerable to the i r own 
e lec tora tes for tha t . But, so long as 
the poundage is not allowed to exceed 100% 
of uptodate rateable values, this involves 
no in jus t ice or inefficiency. Business, 
along with households, would be encouraged 
to make improvements to their properties, 
using space more intensively, because they 
could not incur any a d d i t i o n a l r a t e 
penalty for this. 
Local and central government finance 
Ideally the basis for central government 
revenues could also shif t progressively 
towards rates on land values. In fact i t 
involves the same principle the Government 
already applies to North Sea oil revenues, 
the great bulk of which are in the nature 
of pure economic rents , or a surplus. 
Petroleum revenue taxes help alleviate the 
burden of taxation on labour and capital. 
So too would a national ra te on s i t e 
values. As taxes on wages, capi ta l and 
expenditure (VAT) were reduced gross wage 
and interest payments would tend to fal l , 
leaving r e a l net wages and i n t e r e s t 
unchanged a t the i r 'na tura l ' l evel . The 
excess of the value of output over gross 
wage and interest payments i s the economic 
surplus captured by land as rents. Thus 
we see that a f a l l in taxes on wages and 
in te res t increases aggregate land values. 
This increases rateable values subject to 
the s i t e value r a t e , so t h a t s t a t e 
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revenues from this source would increase 
to compensate for the fal l in conventional 
tax revenues. 
As the 'community fund' increased in this 
way so local au thor i t ies could become 
increasingly selffinancing and reduce 
the i r dependence on central government 
g r a n t s . If the c e n t r a l government 
continued to reduce the burden of taxation 
on labour and capi ta l land rents would 
eventually rise to a level at which local 
authort ies would make net t ransfers to 
central government instead of being net 
r e c i p i e n t s of g ran t s from c e n t r a l 
government. Central government would 
always r e q u i r e adequate revenues to 
finance expenditures which are essentially 
national in character, such as defence and 
much of the national transport network. 
I t would also be responsible for needs and 
resource reallocation grants, as explained 
above. 
Under these conditions s i t e value rat ing 
would ensure that a much larger fraction 
of local expenditure i s raised local ly . 
This accords with the p e r c e p t i b i l i t y 
c r i t e r ion stressed in the Green Paper. 
I t i s bound to increase the degree to 
which local au thor i t ies are perceived as 
accountable to local electorates and would 
surely increase the interest which local 
voters take in local government affairs. 
In view of the fact tha t the s i t e value 
rat ing option meets a l l the c r i t e r i a the 
Government has i t s e l f l a i d down for 
r e s p o n s i b l e and d e m o c r a t i c l o c a l 
government i t i s perhaps surprising that 
the 1986 Green Paper has f a i l e d to 
consider t h i s a l te rna t ive . There are, 
perhaps, two explanations. The f i r s t i s 
tha t the landowning c lass would tend to 
lose from the move, particularly those who 
hold land purely for speculative purposes 
or who use i t inefficiently. This class 
i s influential. Landowners who also own 
building and other improvements would 
suffer a loss on the value of land but a 
gain in the value of improvements. Their 
net position would be l i t t l e changed. 
This applies to homeowners as well as 
businessmen. 
The second explanation may be connected 
with the fact that the 1976 Layfield 
Commission summarily rejected s i te value 
rat ing on the grounds that the newly 
introduced Community Land Act and 
Develoment Land Tax rendered that option 
irrelevant. However, the CLA and the DLT 
both involved the taxation of development 
rather than the 'taxation' of land values. 
People were liable to pay tax only if they 
developed their land. No tax was applied 
to land values if land use (or disuse) was 
unchanged. In any case both the CLA and 
DLT have since been repealed. There i s 
therefore now less excuse than ever for a 
truly reformist government not to examine 
s e r i o u s l y t he s i t e v a l u e r a t i n g 
alternative. 
Radicalism 
The Green Paper describes i t s proposals 
as "the most radical restructur ing of 
local government finance th i s century". 
Yet i t i s hardly radical in the common 
d e f i n i t i o n of t h a t term to connote 
progressive, forwardlooking reforms. For 
basically i t i s proposing a regressive 
head tax unrelated to ab i l i t y to pay or 
social benefits enjoyed, together with a 
uniform business tax scheme that involves 
a major loss of local autonomy. The head 
tax i s normally associated with t r iba l 
village communities where populations are 
small and immobile. I t i s a l so 
associated with mediaeval England. I t 
has never before been seriously advocated 
for modern industrial societies. 
A t r u l y r a d i c a l approach to l oca l 
government would revive the s i t e value 
rat ing or land tax proposals of Lloyd 
George's 1906 Finance Bill that was twice 
vetoed by the landowning interests of the 
House of Lords. The Lords no longer 
possess this veto power. I t i s therefore 
a pity that the opportunity for the people 
to return to the community that which the 
community has created land values has 
been missed again with the sweeping, but 
nonradical Green Paper of 1986. 
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